


1490

AN
HISTORICAL ATLAS
OF THE
INDIAN
PENINSULA

BY
C. COLLIN DAVIES



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
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HISTORICAL ATLAS
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BY
C. COLLIN DAVIES

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INTRODUCTION

THE influence of the physiographic environment on the history of a country is nowhere more apparent than in India. In prehistoric ages desiccation in Central Asia was one of the causes leading to migrations which profoundly altered the racial distribution of the Indian sub-continent. Centuries later, within historical times, invasions from the same area affected India's political structure. All these migrations and invasions added to the heterogeneity of the existing population. According to the orthodox Hindu view the Rajputs are the direct descendants of the Kshatriyas of Vedic India, but this claim is based on questionable genealogies. The Kshatriyas of ancient India disappear from history and this can probably be explained by invasions from Central Asia which shattered the ancient Hindu polity. It is generally accepted that these invading hordes, such as the Yueh-chi and the Hunas, became rapidly hinduized, and that their leaders assumed Kshatriya rank and were accepted as such. Out of this chaos arose a new Hindu polity with new rulers, and the families of invaders which became supreme were recognized as Kshatriyas or Rajputs. It must not be forgotten that in later times many chiefs of the so-called aboriginal tribes also assumed the title of Rajput.

Before the advent of the European nations by sea India was peculiarly susceptible to invasion through the mountain passes of the north-west. Century after century hordes of invaders swept through these gateways to the Indus and the plains of the Panjab. Persians, Greeks, and Afghans, the forces of Alexander the Great, the armies of Mahmud of Ghazna, the hosts of Timur, Babur, and Nadir Shah, and the troops of Ahmad Shah Durrani, all advanced by these routes, either to found kingdoms and remain as conquerors or to retire leaving in their train plundered cities and devastated plains. The history of invasions from Central Asia proves that neither the mountain ranges of the north-west nor the River Indus presented any real barrier

to an enterprising general. Nor did they form a good political frontier and serve as a zone of separation, for the kingdoms of the Persians, the Graeco-Bactrians, the Parthians, the Kushan branch of the Yueh-chi, and the Ephthalites or White Huns in many cases stretched from Afghanistan to the plains of India.

The route taken by invaders after crossing the Indus was also dictated by geographical considerations. From the strategic background of Afghanistan the path for invaders lay along the lines of least resistance. Checked on the south by the deserts of Rajputana, invading armies were forced to enter the Jumna and Ganges valleys through the narrow bottle-neck between the north-eastern extremity of the desert and the foot of the Himalayas. On three occasions has the fate of Hindustan been decided on the plain of Panipat: in 1526, when Babur, the Barlas Turk, defeated Ibrahim Lodi; in 1556, when Akbar crushed the forces of Hemu; and lastly, in 1761, when the Marathas were defeated by Ahmad Shah Durrani. The geographical factor combined with internal decay has been chiefly responsible for this.

The empires of northern India arose in the fertile basins of the Jumna and Ganges where the country was able to support a teeming population. This is also apparent in the development of British rule in India. The fact that the French possessions in the Carnatic were not rich enough to form the nucleus of an empire was one of the reasons for the failure of Dupleix. Clive and Warren Hastings, on the other hand, were able to exploit the wealth of Bengal and Bihar, and, by means of the subsidiary alliance system, to control the resources of the buffer state of Oudh. A detailed account of the payments made by Bengal to Madras and Bombay will be found in the author's *Warren Hastings and Oudh*, p. 145. In this connexion it should be noted that Sind, in the eighth century, was neither rich enough nor sufficiently well placed strategically to serve as a base from which the Arabs could extend

their rule over India. There were, of course, other reasons, such as the decline of the Arab central government and the difficult nature of their line of communications through Baluchistan, which prevented the dispatch of adequate reinforcements. In India, as in Europe, the eighth century witnessed the end of the wave of Arab expansion. It is interesting to contrast British policy towards Afghanistan with that adopted on the north-east frontier. While Afghanistan was converted into a buffer state Burma was completely annexed. It would be incorrect to suppose that Burma was annexed solely for economic reasons. The acquisition of the coastal strip of Arakan and Tenasserim, in 1824, partly resulted from the desire to link up Calcutta with Singapore. While the annexation of Pegu, in 1852, was an economic asset, Upper Burma remained for many years a liability. The exploitation of the wealth of Burma and the development of its natural resources came much later. It was the barren nature of Afghanistan, and the warlike character of its inhabitants, combined with the Russian advance to the Oxus, which led to its being converted into a buffer state. To be an efficient buffer state a country must possess powers of intermediate resistance. These qualities were lacking in Burma.

One fact emerging from a study of the Central Asian policy of the Mughal emperors and forming further proof that distance, combined with poor communications, always defeated the efforts of the Timurids in India, is the extreme difficulty, almost impossibility, of controlling outlying conquests such as Balkh and Badakhshan from a distant centre like Delhi. In the same way the Deccan policy of the Mughal emperors and of their predecessors, the Sultans of Delhi, was strategically unsound. Aurangzeb, like Muhammad bin Tughluq before him, found that the Deccan could not be controlled from Delhi. Muhammad bin Tughluq also discovered that it was equally impossible in those days to control Hindustan from Deogir. In fact one of the most important lessons of Indian history is that a united India was impossible until the development of communications after 1857 facilitated centralization.

It is often suggested in text-books that the

Greek invasion under Alexander gave the impetus to the foundation of a single sovereignty embracing the greater part of India. This is refuted by the fact that the conception of a universal empire is quite familiar in the Vedic period. The conception of *Chakravartin* or universal emperor and the implications of the *asvamedha* sacrifice existed long before Alexander's time. The nearest approach to unity in ancient India was under Asoka, but the backwardness of communications presupposes that there could have been no exaggerated centralization. Implicit in the nature of these early empires was the recognition of almost autonomous powers in the outlying provinces. The difficulty experienced by the central government in its attempts to control the provincial governors will be apparent to all students of Mughal administration.

The influence of geography upon history is very clearly marked in the case of the Deccan and southern India, which, because of distance and geographical isolation, have a separate history from that of northern India, until the intrusion of foreign nations by sea. In their struggle with the Maratha confederacy which had the advantage of a commanding strategical position in the centre of India the unity of the scattered British settlements was at first secured by control of the sea. It will be evident from the map showing the sequence of territorial acquisition that the British, after securing Bihar and Bengal, proceeded to acquire control of the greater part of the coastal districts so as to prevent the access of other powers by sea. It was not until 1849 that the advance to the north-west frontier made the British political frontier coterminous with the geographical.

The influence of climate upon Indian history has been stressed in the maps dealing with the monsoons, rainfall, and agricultural products. For further details attention is directed to the text describing the various maps.

Twenty-five years of teaching and lecturing on Indian history have impressed upon the author the importance of an adequate atlas for the understanding of Indian historical problems. Nothing tends to make a map more confusing than a multiplicity of names and the insertion of


unnecessary detail. Care has therefore been taken to include only those names which are likely to be useful to the student of a particular period or problem. I shall be grateful to all users of this atlas for suggestions for its improvement in later editions.

I wish to thank the Cambridge University Press for allowing me to reproduce two maps from my *Problem of the North-West Frontier*. The map of Burma is based on one prepared by

Mr. G. E. Harvey, whose *History of Burma* is the standard work on that subject. Finally I wish to express my indebtedness to Mr. H. J. Stooke, Librarian of the Indian Institute, for his courtesy in supplying my constant demand for books, and to my colleague Professor Burrow, Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Oxford, for some valuable suggestions in connexion with the maps relating to Ancient India.

C. COLLIN DAVIES

OXFORD
May 1949



ANCIENT INDIA c. 500 B.C.

THOUGH much valuable research has been done by F. G. Pargiter in his *Ancient Indian Historical Tradition* (1922) and by H. Raychaudhuri in his *Political History of Ancient India* (1932), it has been thought inadvisable to include maps based on a knowledge of Vedic, Epic, and Pauranic literature, as history cannot be divorced from chronology. Approximate chronology for northern India begins in the seventh century B.C., for southern India at a much later date. The chronology of India has been built up from the identification of the Sandracottus of the Greek writers with Chandragupta Maurya. The earliest date known for certain in Indian history is the invasion of Alexander the Great in 326 B.C. Rhys Davids in his *Buddhist India* (1903) has summarized the historical information in the Pali texts.

In the seventh century B.C. northern India and part of the Deccan were divided into sixteen principalities, the sixteen *Mahajanapadas* of the Buddhist *Anguttara Nikaya*. Of southern India nothing definite has come to light, but we may suppose that the traditional Tamil kingdoms were in existence. The sixteen great powers of northern India were: (1) Anga, (2) Magadha, (3) Kasi, (4) Kosala, (5) Vajji, (6) Malla, (7) Chedi, (8) Vatsa, (9) Kuru, (10) Panchala, (11) Matsya, (12) Surasena, (13) Asmaka, (14) Avanti, (15) Gandhara, (16) Kamboja.

When Buddhism arose there was no paramount power, but the larger kingdoms were beginning to absorb the smaller. The most important kingdoms were Magadha, Kosala, Vatsa, and Avanti. Eventually, as we shall see, Magadha was to become the paramount power in northern India. In addition to the kingdoms we learn of the existence of republican clans ruled by popular assemblies. In the sixth century B.C. the country to the east of Kosala, between the Himalayas and the Ganges, was the home of the following clans: the Sakiyas, Bulis, Kalamas, Bhaggas, Koliyas, Moriyas, the Mallas of Pava and Kusinara, the Videhas of Mithila, and the Licchavis of Vesali.

Gandhara had been annexed to the Persian empire of Darius which consisted of twenty satrapies. The exact limits of the Indian satrapy cannot be determined, but it probably comprised the Indus valley and parts of the Punjab. It was the richest of the satrapies, paying an annual tribute in gold-dust of 360 Euboic talents, equivalent to over a million pounds sterling.

Scholars have been unable to identify Kamboja with any certainty. The *Nirukta*, a text of about 500 B.C., tells us that the speech of the Kambojas differed from ordinary Indian speech, 'referring doubtless to the tribes living north-west of the Indus who bore that name' (*Cambridge History of India*, vol. i, p. 117).



ANCIENT INDIA
c.500 B.C.

ALEXANDER'S CAMPAIGNS IN NORTHERN INDIA

AFTER subduing Bactria, Alexander, in the spring of 327 B.C., began his preparations for the invasion of India. From some base in the Kabul valley he dispatched his generals, Hephaestion and Perdikkas, by the most direct path to the Indus, probably through the Khyber Pass and not along the Kabul river gorge. Alexander himself proceeded through the mountainous country to the north of the Kabul river. It is impossible to follow his track with any precision. The country watered by the Alishang, Kunar, Panjkora, and Swat rivers was inhabited by the warlike Aspasii and Assaceni. After defeating the Aspasii and taking their capital, Arigaion, he crossed into the territories of the Assaceni, compelling the garrison of their chief stronghold, Massaga, to surrender. While this was taking place Hephaestion and Perdikkas had reached the Indus. Alexander proceeded to Pushkalavati (probably modern Charsadda), but made no attempt to cross the Indus until he had protected his flank by storming the stronghold of Aornus. The site marked on the map is the identification of A. Stein (*On Alexander's Track to the Indus*, 1929), but it seems that the evidence afforded by the classical authors does not warrant its identification with any certainty.

In the early spring of 326 B.C. the Greeks crossed the Indus at Ohind, about 16 miles above Attock. They were welcomed by Ambhi, the Raja of Taxila. Between the Hydaspes and the Akesines lay the kingdom of Porus, who,


despite the defection of his ally Abhisares, prepared to resist the foreign invader on the banks of the Hydaspes. Eventually a passage was forced across the river and Porus was defeated chiefly by the Macedonian cavalry. To celebrate his victory Alexander built the city of Nicaea on the left bank of the river, while, on the opposite bank, there grew up the town of Bucephala. Crossing the Akesines and the Hydraotes he stormed Sangala (unidentified), the capital of the Cathaei. This accomplished, he advanced to the Hyphasis beyond which his troops refused to march. Returning to Nicaea he built a fleet and proceeded down the Hydaspes protected by troops on both banks. The defeat of the Malli was followed by the submission of the Oxydracae.

The map indicates the present courses of the rivers, as the ancient ones cannot be ascertained with certainty. Even the mouths of the Indus and the coast-line have altered considerably.

It was not until the summer of 325 B.C. that Alexander reached Pattala, where in those days the Indus divided into two branches, both of which he explored. Craterus had already set out on his return journey, probably through the Mulla Pass to Kandahar. Alexander marched back through Gedrosia while Nearchus hugged the coast with his fleet. The Indian expedition had lasted approximately three years. Alexander's death in 323 B.C. prevented the consolidation of his Indian conquests.

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(ASOKA'S EMPIRE (250 B.C.))

ASOKA inherited an extensive empire from his father Bindusara and his grandfather Chandragupta. On the north-west his frontier roughly corresponded to the so-called scientific frontier of the nineteenth century, the Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar line. These territories had been ceded to Chandragupta Maurya by Seleucus Nikator and comprised the satrapies of Paropanisadai, Aria, Arachosia, and part of Gedrosia. In the south his empire extended to Nellore, beyond which lay the territories of the independent Cholas, Pandyas, and other powers. Kamarupa on his north-eastern frontier was also independent. The sole conquest of Asoka was that of Kalinga. The extent of his empire may be determined from the geographical distribution of his Rock and Pillar edicts. Only one edict mentions Asoka by name, the edict discovered at Maski in the Nizam's dominions in 1915. His empire was divided into provinces ruled directly from his capital at Pataliputra; provinces administered by viceroys, such as Kalinga with Tosali as capital; and frontier kingdoms acknowledging his suzerainty, such as the territories ceded by Seleucus and those of the Andhras, Pitinikas, and Rashtrikas.

For Mauryan administration we have the evidence of Megasthenes, the Greek ambassador to Chandragupta. Scholars differ as to the date and authenticity of the *Arthashastra*. Modern opinion tends to the view that it is probably a



compilation of the third century A.D. The type of government described is that of an India divided into petty states and not a mighty empire like that of the Mauryas. Much has been made of passages in the *Arthashastra* which seem to corroborate the evidence of Megasthenes, but the differences are much more striking. The frequent references to gold coins must refer to a period in the Christian era.

Mauryan chronology is controversial, but that of Asoka's reign is roughly fixed by the mention in the thirteenth edict of Ptolemy Philadelphos of Egypt (285-247 B.C.); Antigonos of Macedon (278-239 B.C.); Magas of Cyrene (died 258 B.C.); and Alexander of Epirus, who began to reign in 272 B.C.

From Asoka's edicts we learn that in the thirteenth year after his coronation he instituted quinquennial circuits of officials for the purpose of proclaiming the moral law and for the discharge of their normal duties. In the fourteenth year *dharma-mahamatras* were appointed to inculcate piety and to organize charitable endowments. It is difficult to determine Asoka's personal religion from the edicts, though many scholars are convinced that he was a Buddhist and that he held a council to settle the Buddhist canon. His policy of religious toleration and his conception of empire make him one of the greatest kings known to history.

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INDIA c. A.D. 150

THE Western Satraps were foreign invaders of Saka origin. Here we are on firm ground chronologically as their dates are recorded in years of the Saka era, beginning in A.D. 78. The greatest of these rulers was Rudradaman, who became independent between A.D. 130 and 150. Our knowledge of his reign is based on the Junagadh Rock Inscription. From the places named therein it may be inferred that he ruled over Avanti (both eastern and western Malwa); Cutch; Sindhu-Sauvira (the lower Indus valley); Maru (the desert country); and the northern part of the Konkan. He also claimed to have conquered the Yaudheyas and to have defeated the Andhras on two occasions. His capital was at Ujjain.

The original home of the Andhras appears to have been the Telugu country lying between the Krishna and Godavari. They are first mentioned in the *Aitareya Brahmana*. References also occur to them in the edicts of Asoka. With the downfall of the Maurya empire they embarked on a course of territorial aggrandizement, and, under Gautamiputra Sri-Satakarni, overran large tracts of the country formerly ruled over by the Western Satraps. This is clear from an inscription of Queen Bala-Sri. Gautamiputra was succeeded by his son, Vasisthiputra Sri-Pulumavi, who has been identified with the *Satakarni*, or Lord of the Deccan, twice defeated by Rudra-


daman. Ptolemy refers to Sri Pulumavi as the king of Paithan (Pratishthana). It is mainly to the Andhra kingdom that the account of eastern trade in the *Periplus* refers. Andhra rule lasted for five centuries and came to an end in the middle of the third century A.D.

The other great empire of this period was that of the Kushans who, according to the Chinese historians, were a branch of the Yueh-chi. The Kushan chronology still remains an unsolved problem. Numerous theories have been propounded and scholars differ widely as to the exact date of Kanishka's accession (F. W. Thomas inclines to A.D. 78; other theories give the second century A.D.; while the Vikrama era 58 B.C. is still supported by D. N. Mukherji, *Indian Culture*, vol. I, p. 477, 1935). Even their ethnic origins are a matter of controversy.

The empire of Kadphises I stretched from the Parthian frontier to the Indus. Kadphises II extended Kushan power across the Indus. Kanishka added Kashmir, Kashgar, and Khotan to his dominions. He is associated with Mathura, Purushapura, and Kapisa. The map shows the Indian limits of the Kushan empire at its greatest extent. After Kanishka, Kushan rule continued under Huvishka and Vasudeva, until, some time in the third century A.D., India once more became divided into petty states.

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THE CONQUESTS OF MAHMUD OF GHAZNA INDIA IN 1030

The Yamini dynasty of Ghazna and Lahore, commonly known as the Ghaznavids, was founded by Turkish slaves. The most famous of the Ghaznavids was Mahmud (998-1030), whose empire at its greatest extent stretched from the frontiers of Mesopotamia and the Caspian to the Ganges; and from the Aral Sea and Transoxiana to the Indian Ocean, Sind, and the deserts of Rajputana. On his accession he held the provinces of Ghazna, Bust, and Balkh as a vassal of the Samanids of Bukhara. Throwing off his allegiance to the Samanids he annexed Seistan, Ghur, Gharshistan, Khwarizm, Kafiristan, Raiy, Jibal, and Isfahan. His suzerainty was acknowledged by the rulers of Kusdar, Mukran (Mekran), Tabaristan, Jurjan, Khutlan, Saghaniya, and Kadiyan. He conquered the Hindushahiyya kingdom, which extended from Lamaghan to the Beas river, and annexed large tracts around Multan and Bhatinda. His plundering incursions carried him much farther afield into the Jumna-Ganges Doab and even across the desert to Somnath. Authorities differ as to the number and extent of his Indian expeditions. They may be roughly classified as those against the Hindushahiyya dynasty of Waihand; those directed against the ruler of Multan; and his expeditions into other parts of India. Details will be found in Nazim's *Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna*.

The inclusion of a map illustrating his campaigns outside India has been considered essential, as the student gets a distorted view of Indian history if he fails to realize the importance of the Central Asian background. There is a tendency in text-books to stress his Indian expeditions to the exclusion of his more important Central Asian conquests. It must be remembered that Mahmud was an Indian ruler in a very limited sense, that is, only in so far as the Panjab was a frontier province of his extensive empire.


As a corrective to the views of Muslim historians attention is invited to Barthold's estimate of his character and achievements. Barthold con-

tends that Mahmud's subjects in Ghazna, despite the vast booty acquired in his marauding expeditions, suffered from ruinous taxation which made agriculture unprofitable. His religious policy was to a considerable extent dictated by political motives. His recognition of a Caliph who so badly needed recognition strengthened his own position. His patronage of the *ulema* was bestowed only as long as they remained obedient to the secular power. His persecution of heretics, such as the Carmathians of Multan, may be explained by the fact that they had rebelled. It is, however, difficult to describe his cruel treatment of the Carmathians of Raiy as anything but the bitterest of religious persecution. It would be incorrect to regard Mahmud as the patron of Persian national aspirations, although Firdawsi's work was dedicated to him. As a matter of fact Mahmud's *wazir* attempted to make Arabic once more the language of official documents.

The map 'India in 1030' shows the political condition of India at the death of Mahmud. The economic strength of the northern Hindu States had been broken by Mahmud's systematic policy of plunder and massacre. This paved the way for the final subjugation of northern India by the later Muslim invaders and for the establishment of the sultanate of Delhi. His empire rapidly disintegrated after his death, within ten years of which the Seljuqs were once more masters of Khurasan. Disintegration was inherent in the nature of his empire, for consolidation had not kept pace with conquest. Eventually, in 1160, the Shansabani princes of Ghur drove his descendants from Ghazna to Lahore; and by 1186 had conquered the Panjab also.

The Indian powers beyond the reach of Mahmud are clearly marked on the map. For the Chola empire under Rajendra I (1012-44) attention is invited to the text of Map 13. Full details of the Chalukyas, Paramaras, Chauhans, Sumras, Chandels, and Kalachuris will be found in Ray.

THE CONQUESTS OF SULTAN MAHMUD OF GHAZNA



ANCIENT TRADE ROUTES BETWEEN INDIA AND THE WESTERN WORLD

THE trade of southern India with the Western world is very ancient. Although it has been contended that there is no positive evidence for any Indian sea-borne trade with western Asia before 700 B.C., it may be argued that Egypt must have required the embalming spices of the East for the preservation of her mummies. It was probably from southern India that the ships of Tarshish brought Solomon his ivory, apes, and peacocks. The Greeks of Egypt under the Ptolemies traded regularly with India in the three centuries before the Christian era. When Egypt became a Roman province this trade became more lucrative. Trade was conducted by means of intermediaries. The overland trade was in the hands of Syrians, Jews, Armenians, Caucasians, Somalis, and Parthians. By sea it was controlled by the Greeks of Alexandria and Rome, and by the Arabs, who also had a monopoly of the desert routes across Arabia.

The Red Sea and Arabian route to India

Merchants proceeded from Alexandria up the Nile to Coptos and thence by land to Berenice, or across Suez to Arsinoe. In the Red Sea vessels called at Adulis, Muza, and Ocelis. From Arabia Eudaemon (modern Aden) they hugged the coast of the Hadramut, calling at Cane and Moscha, and crossed the mouth of the Persian Gulf to Barbaricon on the Indus, whence they sailed south to Barygaza (Broach) and other ports.

Navigation by means of the monsoon winds

remained a monopoly of the Arabs until their closely guarded secret was discovered by Hippalus about A.D. 50. After this mariners ventured across the open sea from Aden to Malabar and back, making use of the south-west and north-east monsoons. The chief Indian ports were in the Chera, Pandya, and Chola territories. There was also a caravan route across Arabia from Petra to Charax (modern Mohammerah) or to Gerrha near Bahrein.

Land route to India and the Far East

This went from Smyrna through Antioch, Zeugma, and Seleucia to Ctesiphon on the Tigris. From Ctesiphon merchants either went south to Charax and thence by the Persian Gulf or Persian land route to India; or they went to the Far East by way of Kermanshah, Ecbatana, Rhagae, and Meshed to Antiochia Margiana (Merv), whence the silk route continued to China. It was not until the time of Hadrian that Palmyra began to develop. This was the shortest route and became very prosperous between A.D. 130 and 273.

The Romans were faced with the same problem as the English East India Company and had to export bullion to pay for Eastern commodities. To quote Gibbon, 'the subjects of Oriental traffic were splendid and trifling'. An exhaustive description of these commodities will be found in Warmington.

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THE GUPTA EMPIRE

AT THE CLOSE OF THE FOURTH CENTURY A.D.

THE map depicts the Gupta empire at its greatest extent under Chandragupta II (A.D. c. 385–c. 413). Under his father Samudragupta (A.D. c. 335–c. 385) the Guptas became the paramount power in northern India. In the Allahabad Inscription Samudragupta records his conquests. After defeating his neighbours in the Ganges valley he extended his authority over the Protected Tribes, namely, the Yaudheyas, Madrakas, Arjunayanas, Abhiras, and Malavas. Tribute was paid him by the frontier kingdoms of Samatata, Davaka, Kamarupa, Nepal, and Karttipura. In this connexion it must be remembered that the boasts of emperors regarding their conquests are not always reliable. So far Davaka has not been identified.

It was long supposed that Samudragupta in his southern campaign reached Madura and returned by way of Malabar and Maharashtra. But Kattura is now identified with Kothur in Ganjam. Neither is it possible to equate Erandapalla with Erandol in Khandesh, or Devarashtra


with Maharashtra. These places were probably in Orissa and in the Vizagapatam district of Madras. Samudragupta confesses that he made no annexations in the south but contented himself with exacting a heavy tribute.

His son, Chandragupta II (Vikramaditya), conquered Eastern Malwa and the Western Satraps with the result that Ujjain became more important than Pataliputra. His daughter married the Vakataka ruler, Rudrasena II, with whom he probably maintained friendly relations. Towards the end of the fifth century the Gupta empire was overrun by Hunas.

The Gupta age witnessed a revival of Brahmanism. It was the Golden Age of Hindu philosophy, literature, art, and architecture, when Kalidasa wrote his *Ritusamhara*, *Meghaduta*, and *Sakuntala*. Gupta art was national and non-hellenistic. Western influence, however, is apparent in their coinage and astronomy.

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INDIA IN A.D. 640

HARSHA, who has erroneously been regarded as the last great Hindu emperor of northern India, reigned from A.D. 606 to 647. The two main sources for his reign are the panegyric *Harsha-charita* of the Court poet Bana, and the travels of the Chinese Buddhist pilgrim Hiuen Tsang. The best critical account of Harsha's reign is that of R. S. Tripathi in his *History of Kanauj*, 1937.


The extent of Harsha's dominions is a matter of controversy. The truth seems to lie between the extreme views of R. C. Majumdar (*Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, vol. ix, pp. 311 ff., 1923), who limits his conquests to the modern United Provinces, a small area in the eastern Panjab, and Magadha; and those of N. Ray (*Indian Historical Quarterly*, pp. 769-93, 1927), who errs on the other extreme.

The map differs from R. S. Tripathi's account


by the inclusion of Malwa and Valabhi in Harsha's dominions. The Narmada has been taken as the frontier between Harsha and his great rival, Pulakesin II, the Chalukya ruler.

Vincent Smith in his *Early History of India* included Nepal in Harsha's dominions, but modern criticism, based on Sylvain Lévi's *Nepal*, vol. ii, p. 145, 1905, is inclined to the view that at this time Nepal acknowledged the suzerainty of Tibet. R. G. Basak in his *History of North-East India*, ch. vii, 1934, gives the evidence to prove that it was after the death of Sasanka, king of Eastern Bengal, that Harsha extended his frontiers to the borders of Kamarupa so as to include Pundravardhana, Karnasuvarna, and Samatata. Towards the end of his reign, in A.D. 643, Harsha was engaged in subduing the Kongoda country of modern Ganjam.

For the Pallavas of Kanchi attention is directed to *History of the Pallavas of Kanchi*, R. COPALAN, 1922.



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INDIA AT THE CLOSE OF THE NINTH CENTURY A.D.

TOWARDS the end of the eighth century the Gurjara-Pratiharas of the north, the Rashtrakutas of the Deccan, and the Palas of Bengal began their three-cornered struggle for paramountcy. The greatest of the Pratihara rulers were Bhoja I (c. 836-85) and Mahendrapala I (885-c. 910).


Bhoja I consolidated the territories of his predecessors around Kanauj and re-established Pratihara authority over Bundelkhand and Jodhpur. His attempts to expand at the expense of the Palas were checked by Devapala. He was equally unsuccessful in his wars against the Rashtrakutas, for, about A.D. 867, he was forced to retire by Dhruva II. He continued the struggle with Krishna II (875-911), but the evidence is conflicting as both sides boast of their victories. We may conclude that it was an indecisive con-

flict with the Nerbudda as a fluctuating frontier. Bhoja's kingdom stretched from the Sutlej and the foothills of the Himalayas to the Nerbudda; and from the western confines of the Pala kingdom to the Arabs in Sind.

Mahendrapala I (885-c. 910) extended the Pratihara kingdom at the expense of the Palas. His inscriptions extend as far east as Paharpur, from which it may be inferred that he controlled the greater part of Magadha. Evidence of his rule in Saurashtra is to be found in the Una grants. He lost part of the Panjab to Kashmir, but still retained the country around the modern district of Karnal. His inscriptions have been conveniently collected by H. C. Ray in his *Dynastic History of Northern India*, vol. i, pp. 570-1, 1931.


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THE CHOLA EMPIRE UNDER KULOTTUNGA I c. 1100

From the third to the ninth century Chola history is obscure. Towards the end of the ninth century the Cholas under Aditya overthrew the Pallavas; but in the reign of Parantaka I (907-53) the Chola country was overrun by the Rashtrakutas of the Deccan. With the accession of Rajaraja the Great, in 985, the Cholas began to expand until they became the paramount power in southern India. Rajaraja's conquests included the Chera and Pandya country, Vengi, Kalinga, and Ceylon. By means of a powerful fleet he annexed the Laccadive and Maldive islands. Under his son, Rajendra I (1012-44), who extended these conquests, the Chola empire attained its greatest extent. It is usually supposed that he reached the Ganges during one of his expeditions, but the Tiruvalangadu plates prove that the expedition was led by one of his generals and that Rajendra himself never advanced beyond the Godavari. To celebrate this expedition he assumed the title of Gangaikonda and built a new capital city, Gangaikondacholapuram.

Modern scholarship inclines to the belief that Rajendra undertook an expedition against the


Sailendra empire of Srivijaya and its dependencies in the Malay Peninsula and Archipelago. There is no evidence that any territory was annexed to the Chola empire. The whole problem is well discussed by Sastri (vol. i, pp. 254-68), where he accepts Coedès's identification of Srivijaya with Palembang in Sumatra (vide Map 14).

The most conspicuous of the later Cholas, or Chalukya-Cholas, was Kulottunga I (1070-1120). The map shows his empire at the height of his power. Ceylon had revolted before he ascended the throne; and, towards the end of his reign, Gangavadi was lost to the rising power of the Hoysalas. The frontier between his possessions and those of the Chalukya ruler, Vikramaditya VI, was a fluctuating one.

Chola administration was well organized, especially in the sphere of local government. Vast irrigation works were constructed. The best examples of Chola architecture are the huge temples of Tanjore. During the thirteenth century the Chola empire gradually disintegrated, its place eventually being taken by Vijayanagar.

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HINDU EXPANSION IN THE ARCHIPELAGO

In *The Legacy of India* (edited by G. T. Garratt, 1937) great prominence was given, where possible, to the influence of India on Europe, but still more might have been made of India's influence on Asia, notably the introduction of Buddhism into Tibet, China, and Japan. The spread of Buddhism across Asia may well be considered India's greatest contribution to the civilization of mankind in general.

In the Hindu colonization of Indo-China and the Malay Archipelago, the social, religious, and artistic ideals of India maintained themselves for many centuries and evolved fresh developments of art in which to express themselves. Hindu culture was prominent here for ten centuries until the advent of Islam in the fifteenth century. Definite evidence exists of Hindu culture, colonies, and kingdoms in Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Bali, Cambodia, Champa, the Malay Peninsula, and Lower Burma. Evidence of this overseas expansion dates back to the first century A.D. in the case of Cambodia; to the second century so far as Champa is concerned. By the fourth century Hindu kingdoms had been established in Borneo. Inscriptions have been discovered along


the Mahakam river in eastern Borneo and in the valley of the Kapuras river of western Borneo. Java contained Hindu kingdoms as early as the fifth century A.D. Hindu settlements in Bali probably date back to the sixth century. Bali still retains its Hindu culture and civilization, for it was not submerged beneath the flood of Islam.

From the eighth to the thirteenth century the Sailendra empire was the dominant power in the Archipelago. Its rulers were patrons of the Mahayanist form of Buddhism. To this dynasty we owe the greatest surviving monument of Indian Buddhism, the famous stupa at Borobudur. (For the struggle between the Cholas and the Sailendras see the text facing Map 13.)

Evidence of Hindu culture abounds in the form of Brahmanical rites, Hindu gods, Indian months, astronomical details, place-names, and Sanskrit inscriptions. The earliest and most persistent characteristic of Indian civilization in these regions is its Brahmanic character. In all cases the development of Buddhism comes later. Much research is needed before any definite conclusions can be reached as to when this overseas expansion began and whence it originated.

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HINDU EXPANSION IN THE ARCHIPELAGO

INDIA IN 1236

THIS map indicates the probable extent of the sultanate of Delhi at the death of Iltutmish. We have seen how in 1186 the Ghaznavids of Lahore were expelled by Muhammad of Ghor. Several years of warfare culminating in the final battle of Taraori in 1192 gave him northern India almost to the gates of Delhi. His general Qutb-ud-din Aibak subjugated the Gangetic Doab, while Bihar and Bengal were overrun by another general, Muhammad Bakhtyar. After the assassination of Muhammad of Ghor, in 1206, Aibak became the first Sultan of Delhi and founded the dynasty known as the Slave Kings of Delhi. But the Muslim hold on northern India was precarious, and it was left for Iltutmish (1211-36) to complete the work of Aibak.


He crushed rebellion in the Panjab, re-annexed Bengal, conquered Sind, and recovered vast tracts in Rajputana. Towards the end of his reign, in 1234, he advanced into Malwa, capturing Bhilsa and Ujjain. His last campaign was against the

turbulent Khokhars of the Salt Range, but he died before his task was accomplished. During his reign Chengiz Khan, the Mongol ruler, reached the Indus in pursuit of Mangbarni, the fugitive Khwarizm prince. Fortunately for Iltutmish India escaped a visitation from this great scourge of Asia. The map differs from that of A. B. M. Habibullah, who excludes from Iltutmish's dominions Malwa and the area between the Salt Range and the trans-Indus foothills (vide ch. ix). After the death of Iltutmish internal dissensions and Mongol raids on the north-west frontier prevented the consolidation of his conquests. It was not until the reign of Balban (1266-86) that the sultanate once more became powerful.

The struggles of the Yadavas of Deogir, the Kakatiyas of Warangal, and the Hoysalas may be conveniently studied in the *Cambridge History of India*, vol. iii, ch. xviii.

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INDIA IN 1236

Sultanate of Delhi
under Ilututmish



THE SULTANATES OF THE DECCAN AND THE HINDU KINGDOM OF VIJAYANAGAR IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

THE fifteenth century witnessed the dismemberment of the Bahmani kingdom, the rise of the Marathas, and the advent of the Portuguese. Towards the end of this century the Bahmani kingdom began to disintegrate, its place being taken by the five sultanates of the Deccan: the Nizam Shahis of Ahmadnagar (Shiahs except for the founder); the Adil Shahis of Bijapur (Shiah); the Kutb Shahis of Golconda (Shiah); the Imad Shahis of Berar (Sunni); and the Barid Shahis of Bidar (Sunni). To the north of the Deccan sultanates lay the three Muslim kingdoms of Gujarat, Khandesh, and Malwa. To the south, with the Raichur Doab as a fluctuating frontier, was the Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagar. There were, therefore, nine separate States; and the history of the sixteenth century is a confusing record of alliances and counter-alliances, Hindus allying with Muslims, and Sunnis with Shiahs. The combination varied. The causes of this internecine warfare were multifarious and at times trivial. Eventually the Muslims combined in 1565 to overthrow the Hindus of Vijayanagar at the battle of Talikota, or, more correctly, Raksas-Tagdi. In 1574 Ahmadnagar absorbed Berar, and in 1619 Bidar was annexed by Bijapur.

The results of this warfare were:

1. The defeat of Vijayanagar.
2. The growth of Portuguese power along the coast, for, during the critical years when the Portuguese were consolidating their power at Goa and elsewhere, the struggle between Vijayanagar and the Sultanates drew the fire of Islam and prevented the expulsion of the European intruders.
3. The expansion of the Mughal empire into the Deccan. Between 1596 and 1600 Akbar annexed the greater part of Ahmadnagar. The two kingdoms of Bijapur and Golconda were overrun by Aurangzeb in 1686 and 1687.


The kingdom of Vijayanagar was founded on the ruins of Chola power and reached its greatest extent under Krishna Deva Raya (1509-29). R. S. Aiyar (*Journal of Indian History*, April 1927) contends that Vijayanagar was not totally destroyed at Talikota. Minor dynasties continued for some time afterwards (vide *The Aravidu Dynasty of Vijayanagar*, H. HERAS, 1927). W. H. Moreland's contention (*Agrarian System of Moslem India*, p. 12) that the practice of appointing provincial governors on farming terms prevailed in Vijayanagar has not been accepted by Salatore.

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**THE
SULTANATES
OF THE
DECCAN
AND THE
HINDU KINGDOM
OF
VIJAYANAGAR
IN THE
SIXTEENTH CENTURY**

Boundaries
Debatable Area



THE EMPIRE OF MUHAMMAD BIN TUGHLUQ IN 1335

UNDER Muhammad bin Tughluq (1325-51) the sultanate of Delhi reached its greatest extent, and, in area, is comparable only to the empires of Asoka and Aurangzeb. It was divided into twenty-three provinces: Lahore, Multan, Uch, Sivastan, Kalanau, Sarsuti, Kurham, Samana, Hansi, Delhi, Budaun, Oudh, Kanauj, Gujarat, Malwa, Kara, Bihar, Lakhnauti, Deogir, Jajnagar, Telingana, Dvara Samudra, and Mabar. A. M. Husain inclines to the belief that Malabar probably formed an additional province and that it was distinct from the seaports and territories of the independent Hindu rajas mentioned by Ibn Battuta. Opinions differ as to the status of the Rajput kingdoms, but it seems that the Rajputs in the heart of Rajputana maintained their independence, while those nearest to Delhi were forced by geographical proximity to pay tribute.

Two annexations need to be recorded after 1335: the conquest of Nagarkot in the Kangra valley of the Panjab, in 1337; and the absorption of Kathiawar and Cutch, in 1349.


The year 1335 has been selected for this map

because the rebellion of Sayyid Ahsan Shah, in 1334, was followed by the establishment of the independent sultanate of Madura which was the signal for widespread revolts. By 1344 the revenue collections in the Deccan had fallen by 90 per cent. Rebellion followed rebellion, culminating in the proclamation, in 1347, of the independence of the Bahmani kingdom in the Deccan.

It is important to note a fundamental difference between Khalji and Tughluq policy in the Deccan. Khalji policy was not one of occupation, whereas the Tughluqs aimed at permanent conquest. An interesting parallel can be drawn between the Deccan policy of Muhammad bin Tughluq and that of the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb. In those days of backward communications it was impossible to control the Deccan from an external centre in Hindustan, just as it was equally impossible to rule Hindustan from Deogir. A strongly centralized government was not achieved until the development of communications after 1857.

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INDIA IN 1561

THE MUGHAL EMPIRE AT THE DEATH OF AKBAR (1605)

THE second battle of Panipat, in 1556, involving the defeat of Hemu by Akbar, is of outstanding importance in the history of India, for no Mughal empire had previously existed in spite of attempts to create one. In 1561 Akbar's kingdom comprised the Panjab and Multan; the basin of the Ganges and Jumna to Allahabad; the country between the Gumti and the foothills of the Himalayas; Gwalior and Ajmir. The province of Kabul was held by his half-brother, Muhammad Hakim; Kandahar belonged to Persia. Outside his dominions were the Deccan and southern India; Kashmir; Rajputana, Sind, and Gondwana under independent chiefs and rajas; Bihar and Bengal under an Afghan ruler, Sulaiman Kararani; and the Muslim kingdoms of Gujarat and Khandesh. The Portuguese were firmly established at strategic points along the coast.


Between 1562 and 1576 he added to his dominions Malwa (completely annexed in 1562), Chitor (1568), Ranthambhor (1569), Kalanjar in Bundelkhand (1569), Gujarat (1573), and Bengal (1576). Thus, by the year 1576 Akbar was master of the whole of Hindustan with the exception of lower Sind. Subsequent additions to the empire were Kashmir (1586), Sind (1591), part of Orissa (1592), Baluchistan and Mekran (1594), and Kandahar (1595). As a result of his Deccan campaigns Berar, Khandesh, and part of Ahmadnagar were annexed between 1595 and 1601. At his death, in 1605, his empire comprised the following *subas* (provinces): Kabul (including Kashmir), Lahore, Multan (including Sind), Delhi, Oudh, Agra, Ajmir, Ahmadabad, Malwa, Allahabad, Bihar, Bengal, Khandesh, Berar, and Ahmadnagar (not fully subjugated).

Akbar, the greatest of the Mughal emperors, deliberately accepted compromise as the basis of his empire. By his policy of *Sulh-i-Kull* (uni-

versal toleration) and his abolition of the *Jizya*, the detested poll-tax on non-Muslims, he strove to conciliate the subject Hindu population and to secure their loyalty to his rule. His religious policy resembled that of European monarchs during the period of the Protestant Reformation: it was an assertion of the supremacy of the State, politically, economically, and financially. It was inextricably bound up with his conception of sovereignty. The powers of the *imam* or ruler were interpreted from the Koran by the *ulema*. This served as a check upon a weak king; but strong rulers, like Ala-ud-din Khalji and Akbar, for political reasons attempted to curb or crush the power of the *ulema*. Akbar's conception of sovereignty was autocratic, hence the curbing of the powers of the *ulema* by the so-called Infallibility Decree.

Even his abolition of the *jizya* was an astute move. This unpopular tax was probably an unreliable source of income and the political advantages of its abolition outweighed the doubtful financial gains. Moreover, land revenue was the most important source of revenue; and, as the secularization of the administration progressed, the religious taxes, *jizya*, *kham*s, and *zaka*t, became less and less important. Economic considerations also prompted Akbar to resume the *sayurghal* lands and to reform the department presided over by the *Sadr-i-Sudur*.

There can be no doubting the fact that Akbar was interested in the study of Comparative Religion, but his religious policy was, to a very great extent, secondary to dynastic and political considerations. It was the reversal of this policy of conciliation by his immediate successors and their gradual departure from the main principles of his rule that eventually led to the decline of the Mughal empire.



INDIA IN 1398

WE have seen how the empire of the Qaraunah Turks began to disintegrate under Muhammad bin Tughluq. His successor, Firuz Shah (1351-88), made no attempt to recover the lost territories in the Deccan or to punish the rebels in Bengal. Eastern Bengal had been independent since 1338 and the whole of Bengal had been lost to the Tughluqs by 1341. The Bahmani kingdom of the Deccan dates from 1347. Towards the end of Firuz Shah's reign, in 1382, Khandesh in the valley of the Tapti became a separate kingdom. After the death of Firuz Shah province after province either declared its independence or refused to acknowledge the suzerainty of Delhi: Malwa, in 1392; Jaunpur, in 1394; and Gujarat, in 1396. In the territories still under the nominal control of Delhi factious nobles contended for the possession of two puppet kings. This was the condition of northern India when, in 1398, the troops of Timur, the Barlas Turk, crossed the Indus and occupied Multan.


There have been two types of invaders through the passes of the north-west frontier: raiders like Timur, Nadir Shah, and Ahmad Shah Durrani

who came to devastate the fertile plains and to plunder the rich cities of northern India; and conquerors like Muhammad of Ghor and Babur who founded kingdoms in Hindustan.

Timur's task was facilitated by internal anarchy. Crossing the Indus in 1398 he took Talamba and marched by way of Bhatnair to Delhi, ravaging the country-side and massacring the inhabitants on the slightest pretext. Leaving Delhi in January 1399, he returned through Meerut along the foothills of the Himalayas to Bannu, which he reached in March of the same year. This visitation of Timur intensified the centrifugal tendencies in the sultanate of Delhi. Samana, Bayana, Kalpi, Mahoba, Mewar, Gwalior, and the Hindus of the Doab rose in revolt. Upper Sind and the Panjab were ruled by Khizr Khan as Timur's viceroy. The once mighty empire of the Tughluqs became a subject for derision. A contemporary distich refers to the empire of the ruler of the world as stretching from Delhi to Palam, a village a few miles distant from the capital.

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INDIA ON THE EVE OF BABUR'S INVASION (1525)

At this time India was divided into a northern and southern belt of Muslim powers each of which was menaced by strong Hindu forces to the south. The Bahmani kingdom of the Deccan had resolved itself into the five sultanates of Berar, Ahmadnagar, Bidar, Bijapur, and Golconda, to the immediate north of which lay three other Muslim kingdoms, Gujarat, Malwa, and Khandesh. To the south of the Deccan sultanates stretched the mighty Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagar. The northern belt of Muslim powers comprised the Arghun kingdom of Sind; the Langah kingdom of Multan; the Lodi sultanate of Delhi; and Bengal. Threatening the Lodi sultanate was the powerful Rajput confederacy under Rana Sanga of Mewar. The chief factor in the political history of northern India at the beginning of the sixteenth century was the growing Rajput predominance.

Babur was a Barlas Turk. Through his father he was descended from Timur; through his mother from Chaghatai, a son of Chengiz Khan. He was, therefore, both a Timurid Turk and a Chaghatai Mongol. The blood of the two great


scourges of Asia mixed in his veins. His ambition was to rule over the empire of his ancestor Timur, but he was thwarted by his greatest enemy, Shaibani Khan, who ruled over the Uzbek tribes of Turkestan. Driven from his ancestral dominions to Kabul, the economic factor forced him to raid the plains of India. Much of his success was due to the possession of the strong strategic position of Kabul. His task was also facilitated by the weakness of the Delhi sultanate under Ibrahim Lodi. The Lodis were Afghans and their conception of sovereignty was tribal, Ibrahim being merely the greatest of the Afghan chiefs.

Babur defeated Ibrahim at Panipat in 1526. This has long been regarded as an artillery victory, but it is a misconception based on an inaccurate translation of the Turki word *araba* as gun-carriages when *araba* simply means carts (vide *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, s.v. 'Panipat').

Having crushed the Lodi power, Babur overwhelmed the Rajputs at Khanua, in 1527. By 1529 he had overrun Bihar. He died in 1530.

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THE PORTUGUESE POSSESSIONS IN THE EAST AND THE ROUTE TO INDIA

The fact that the Turks had squatted down on the medieval land-routes to the East, making them unprofitable for merchants, led to attempts to discover a sea-route to India. This quest was begun by Portugal, the smallest nation on the Atlantic sea-board and the first to become consolidated. Portuguese mariners rounded Cape Bojador as early as 1434; and, by the death of Prince Henry the Navigator, in 1460, had added eighteen degrees of latitude to the verified geography of the African coast from Cape Bojador to Sierra Leone. In 1471 they crossed the Equator and by 1484 had reached the mouth of the Congo. In 1486 Bartholomew Diaz rounded the Cape of Good Hope. In 1497-8 came the epoch-making voyage of Vasco da Gama, who anchored off Calicut on the 20th of May 1498, the voyage from Lisbon having taken ten months and twelve days.

The most important of the Portuguese representatives in the East was Albuquerque (1509-15). He was as firm a believer in sea-power as Almeida (1505-9), but he held that land fortresses were also essential.

Albuquerque's strategy aimed at:

1. Intercepting the Muslim trade at its base. For this reason he built Ormuz to control

the entrance to the Persian Gulf. His failure to capture Aden and control the mouth of the Red Sea was compensated by the seizure of the island of Socotra.


2. Destroying Muslim trade with the Malabar ports. This was why he seized Goa in 1510.
3. Destroying Muslim trade with the Malay Archipelago. The capture of Malacca, in 1511, gave him control of the Spice Islands.

Portuguese sea-captains opened up commercial relations with Ceylon, the Coromandel coast, Bengal, Pegu, Siam, Cochin-China, and Macao in China.

The Portuguese empire in the east was a coastal empire based on command of the sea and on the occupation of widely separated strategic bases. Command of the sea was attained by the destruction of the Turkish fleet, which had been built of timber brought overland to the Red Sea. The absence of timber on the shores of the Red Sea which prevented this fleet from being rebuilt was one cause of the success of the Portuguese in Indian waters. With the arrival of more powerful rivals, like the Dutch and the English, the Portuguese lost control of the sea and were ousted from most of their possessions.


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THE MARATHAS IN 1680

GRANT DUFF's *History of the Mahrattas* is almost entirely political and fails to stress the fact that, for two centuries before Sivaji's revolt against Aurangzeb, a religious, social, and literary revival had been taking place in Maharashtra. On the other hand, there is a tendency amongst modern Maratha historians to pay too much attention to this movement, for very little is known of the Marathas before Sivaji placed himself at the head of the Hindu reaction against Muslim rule in the seventeenth century.

With the exception of the Portuguese possessions of Goa, Chaul, Salsette, and Bassein, the Abyssinian pirate stronghold of Janjira, and the English settlement on the island of Bombay, Sivaji at the time of his death in 1680 controlled the whole of the Konkan from the country around Daman in the north to Karwar in the south. His eastern boundary ran through the districts of Nasik and Poona and enclosed within his territories the whole of Satara and most of Kolhapur. In addition he held Bellary, Kopal, Sira, Bangalore, Kolar, Vellore, Arni, and Gingi, together with a share in his brother's principality of Tanjore. His successor, Sambhaji, proved no

match for Aurangzeb and was captured and executed in 1689. By the opening years of the eighteenth century the Marathas had recovered their power.

In his administrative system Sivaji was influenced by both Hindu political tradition and Muslim practice. He was assisted by a council, the *Ashta Pradhan*, but was not bound to accept its advice. Much of his revenue was derived from the plunder of his neighbours, from whom he levied a tax called *chauth*, a demand for a fourth of the standard land-revenue assessment of a place. Sometimes an extra tenth, known as *sardeshmukhi*, was extorted. The levying of *chauth* did not impose on Sivaji any corresponding obligation to protect a district from foreign invasion or against internal disorder. It merely freed the inhabitants from any further plunder by his troops. *Chauth* was based on force, and, as developed later, could be exacted from any part of India where the Marathas were powerful enough. *Sardeshmukhi*, on the other hand, was limited in its application to the Deccan, and based on a legal fiction, Sivaji claiming to be the hereditary *sardeshmukh* of the Deccan.

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
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THE MARATHAS IN 1680

Sivaji's Territories



Maharashtra



THE MUGHAL EMPIRE AT THE END OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY


THE departure of Akbar's immediate successors, Jahangir, Shah Jahan, and Aurangzeb, from the main principles of his rule, culminating in the religious discriminations and the political intolerance of Aurangzeb, eventually produced a far-reaching Hindu reaction which provoked the Marathas of the Deccan and the Rajputs and Jats of the north to raise the standard of revolt throughout the peninsula. One of the basic principles of Akbar's administration had been to demand no more than one-third of the gross produce from the peasant. Under his successors the pressure increased, until by the reign of Aurangzeb, if not earlier, the revenue demand had risen to one-half. At the beginning of his reign Shah Jahan did something to correct the inefficiency of Jahangir, but his aggressive policy in Central Asia, his expeditions against Balkh and Badakhshan, and his attempts to recover Kandahar, brought the empire to the verge of

bankruptcy. Aurangzeb's hopeless attempt to conquer the Deccan was a political miscalculation and a military blunder of the first magnitude. The expansion of the Mughal empire into the Deccan, especially during the second half of Aurangzeb's reign, proved fatal to its solidarity. A general decay ensued in all branches of the administration, which was accompanied by a corresponding economic decline. Under the miserable puppets who succeeded Aurangzeb, the Hindu reaction against Muslim predominance gathered strength until the Marathas overran almost the whole of India from the banks of the Chenab to the borders of Bengal, devastating the country and levying the tax known as *chauth*, a demand for a fourth of the standard land-revenue assessment.

Attention is drawn to the European settlements along the coast.

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THE MUGHAL EMPIRE AT THE END OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

Approximate Boundaries — — — — —

European Settlements thus — Madras (British)

In Revolt — **RAJPUTS**

INDIA IN THE TIME OF WARREN HASTINGS

WHEN Hastings became Governor of Bengal in 1772 the Mughal empire had resolved itself into conflicting factions. During this turmoil able adventurers and provincial governors had carved out kingdoms for themselves. In the struggles of the Nizam of Hyderabad, Haidar Ali of Mysore, and the Maratha confederacy there was no idea of a balance of power as a factor of political stability. Territorial aggrandizement and paramountcy in the Indian peninsula were the declared aims of the Marathas. The struggle of the French and English for commercial and territorial supremacy had ended in the victories of Clive. The French had been ousted from the Carnatic, and Plassey (1757) had left the Company the *de facto* rulers of Bengal. Munro's victory at Buxar (1764) had placed Oudh and the Mughal emperor at the Company's disposal. By the Treaty of Allahabad (1765) Oudh was made into a buffer state against Maratha encroachments and Shuja-ud-daulah was reinstated as ruler. In return for the tribute of Bengal, the Mughal emperor granted to the Company the *diwani* of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, the last-mentioned in those days being a small area around Midnapore.

Hastings, by the Treaty of Benares (1773),

reversed Clive's policy. Because of the emperor's flight to the Marathas, Hastings reclaimed the provinces of Kora and Allahabad which he promptly sold to Shuja-ud-daulah. He also refused to continue the payment of the tribute. All expenses of the British subsidiary force in Oudh were to be defrayed by Shujah-ud-daulah.


On the death of Shuja-ud-daulah, the hostile majority on Hastings's council increased the subsidy and forced the new ruler, Asaf-ud-daulah, by the Treaty of Faizabad (1775), to surrender in full sovereignty to the Company the wealthy *zamindari* of Chait Singh comprising Benares and Ghazipur.

In order to strengthen the buffer state of Oudh, Hastings had assisted its ruler to conquer the Rohilla country. It was the action of the Bombay Government in championing the claim of Raghoba to the peshwaship of the Maratha confederacy that led to war with the Marathas which ended with the Treaty of Salbai (1782).

During Hastings's governor-generalship the security of the Company's possessions was threatened by the Marathas, by a formidable Indian coalition headed by the Nizam of Hyderabad, and by the arrival of a French naval force in Indian waters.

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INDIA IN 1798

WHEN Wellesley assumed office in 1798 he found that the non-intervention policy pursued by Cornwallis and Shore had produced a situation of extreme danger. Unsupported by Shore, the Nizam of Hyderabad had been overwhelmed by the Marathas at Kharda in 1795. (For the territories surrendered to the Marathas after Kharda see *Poona Residency Correspondence*, ed. V. G. Dighe, vol. iv, pp. 307-13.) By the Treaty of Mhar (1796) Nana Phadnavis promised to waive most of the Maratha territorial claims on the Nizam, but this was not ratified by the Peshwa until 1798 (vide Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, vol. ii, pp. 266-84).

Wellesley therefore found the British without allies and French influence paramount at the Indian courts. Both Daulat Rao Sindhia and the Nizam had entrusted their best battalions to French officers. The ruler of Berar had been engaged in anti-British intrigues. Fortunately the Gaikwar of Baroda remained aloof from all combinations against the Company and Indore was weakened by internal dissensions. Tipu Sultan of Mysore was intriguing on all sides against the British, with Kabul, Poona, the


Nizam, and the French. To make matters worse Bonaparte was in Egypt and it was the aim of French policy to reverse the decision of the Seven Years War. Oudh was in no condition to serve as a buffer state. The Carnatic and Tanjore were in a condition bordering on anarchy. Neither was the Nawab of the Carnatic disposed actively to support the Company. Wellesley also found the army badly organized and the financial condition of the Company distressing.

Since the days of Warren Hastings British territory had increased by the rendition of the Guntur Sarkar and by the annexation of Malabar, Dindigul, and the Baramahal at the close of the war with Tipu in 1792. Coorg had also been placed under British protection. The Maratha frontier had been advanced to the Tungabhadra and the Nizam had received territory on the north-east of Mysore. The chief mistake of Cornwallis had been to allow Tipu to retain Mangalore and thus enable him to receive French supplies.

In 1798 Ceylon was declared a Crown Colony. Almora (Kumaon) had been overrun by the Gurkhas of Nepal in 1790.

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THE PARTITION OF MYSORE IN 1799

The British fought four wars with Mysore:

- (1) 1767-9, which ended in favour of Haider Ali, who practically dictated terms under the walls of Madras.
- (2) 1780-4, after which by the Treaty of Mangalore (1784) there was a mutual restoration of conquests.
- (3) 1790-2, in the time of Cornwallis. By the Treaty of Seringapatam (1792) half of Mysore was ceded by Tipu and divided between the allies on a revenue basis, each ally receiving territory to the value of about £400,000.
- (4) March to May 1799, under Wellesley.


After the death and defeat of Tipu, Wellesley decided to form a small central kingdom of Mysore and to restore the ancient Hindu Wodeyar dynasty. What was left was divided between the Nizam and the Company. British gains included the whole of Kanara along the coast, Wynaad in the south-west, the districts of Coimbatore and Darapuram in the south-east, the town and island of Seringapatam, and two large tracts on the east of Mysore dominating all the passes leading on to the plains of the Carnatic. British territory now stretched in a continuous line between the Malabar and Coromandel coasts.

By this arrangement Mysore, except on the north, was entirely surrounded by British territory and by the territories of a British ally, the Raja of Coorg. The Nizam's share included the districts of Gooty and Gurramkonda to the north-east of Mysore; and part of the district, but not the fort, of Chitaldroog. He kept his gains until 1800, when they were ceded to the British in lieu of the payment for the subsidiary force. Although the Peshwa had not co-operated in the war he was offered the districts of Harpanahalli and Sonda between Kanara and the Tungabhadra. This territory was eventually divided between the Nizam and the Company, as the Peshwa declined to accept any share.

The British gained more than they would have if the whole of Mysore had been dismembered between them and the Nizam, for Mysore was really under British control from this time onwards. Mysore was forced to subscribe to a special subsidiary treaty by which, in time of war, the subsidy paid for the protecting force could be increased by the British, who were also empowered, in times of difficulty and danger, to take over the whole administration. One of the most important clauses of this treaty aimed at securing the welfare of the inhabitants.

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INDIA IN 1805

THIS map illustrates the extension of the subsidiary alliance system and the annexations during Wellesley's governor-generalship (1798-1805). The Partition of Mysore has been treated separately.

As early as 1799 the Company took over the administration of Tanjore and Surat. The administration of the Carnatic was likewise transferred to the Company in 1801. In the same year the ruler of Oudh was forced to surrender Rohilkhand, Farrukhabad, Mainpuri, Etawah, Cawnpore, Fategarh, Allahabad, Azimgarh, Basti, and Gorakhpur. This meant that Oudh ceased to be a buffer state, for, except where it was bounded by Nepal, it was entirely surrounded by British territory. Its weakness as a buffer state had been Wellesley's excuse for these annexations.

Wellesley was the first governor-general to realize that the time had come for the British to stand forth as the paramount power in India. This belief prompted his annexations and led to the extension of the subsidiary alliance system. It also led to war with the Marathas. By the Treaty of Bassein (1802) the Peshwa, Baji Rao II, was reinstated at Poona as a puppet of the Company, in return for which he agreed to receive a British subsidiary force and to accept British arbitration in all disputes with the other country powers. This made war with the Marathas inevitable. At the end of the war that followed Berar, by the Treaty of Deogaon, ceded the pro-

vince of Cuttack, including Balasore, which linked up Bengal with Madras. By the Treaty of Surji Arjangaon, Sindhia ceded the Upper Doab, his forts and territories to the north-east of the Rajput States, the districts of Broach and Ahmadnagar, and his possessions south of the Ajanta hills. Asirgarh, Burhanpur, and certain districts in the valley of the Tapti were restored to him. The Peshwa received the fort and district of Ahmadnagar and the Nizam the district south of the Ajanta hills. That part of Berar which lay to the west of the river Wardha and south of the fortress of Gawilgarh was also bestowed on the Nizam.

Relations with the Nizam were placed on a proper footing by the Treaty of 1800 which broadened the basis of the 1798 treaty. The subsidiary force for his protection was stationed inside his dominions and territory ceded in lieu of a subsidy, namely, the districts of Bellary and Cuddapah which he had acquired in 1792 and 1799.


It was during this period that Nepal reached its greatest extent, for, in 1803, the Gurkhas took Dera Dun and annexed Garhwal.

The kingdom of Kandy in the interior of Ceylon was not finally subdued until 1815.

Wellesley was recalled before he was able to accomplish his aim of crushing the Maratha power; and it remained for the Marquess of Hastings (1813-23) to complete his work.

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INDIA IN 1836

This map illustrates the changes which had taken place since the departure of Wellesley.

Under Lord Minto (1807-13) Ranjit Singh of Lahore agreed to abstain from all interference in the affairs of the Cis-Sutlej Sikhs who had placed themselves under British protection.

The administration of the Marquess of Hastings (1813-23) was of outstanding importance in the establishment of British paramountcy. Gurkha aggressions led to war with Nepal (1814-16). They were defeated after a stubborn resistance, and, by the Treaty of Segauli (1816), ceded Garhwal and Kumaun together with most of the Tarai. They also agreed to withdraw from Sikkim and to accept a British Resident at Katmandu.

In the final Maratha war (1817-19) British arms were everywhere successful. The Peshwa was deposed, deprived of his territories, and forced to reside at Bithur near Cawnpore. The Raja of Satara was allowed to retain a small area around his ancestral domains until it lapsed to the British in the days of Dalhousie. The independence of Sindhia, Holkar, and Berar was completely shattered and their territories greatly reduced in size. Holkar was forced to cede

Ajmer, the strategical key to Rajputana. The pirate chiefs of the Konkan were compelled to surrender their coastal holdings. Treaties were formed with the important Rajput States of Jaipur, Jodhpur, and Mewar; and also with the smaller Rajput States of Banswara, Dungarpur, Partabgarh, Jaisalmer, and Kotah. Bhopal, the States of Bundelkhand, Malwa, and Kathiawar were brought under British protection.


Thus, by the suppression of the Pindaris, the defeat of the Marathas, and the inclusion of the Rajput and other States within the pale of British protection, the British became the paramount power in the Indian peninsula.

Burmese aggressions led to the first Burmese war (1824-6). The Burmese were defeated and compelled to surrender Assam, Arakan, and the coast of Tenasserim. They were to abstain from interference in Cachar, Jaintia, and Manipur. The territories of the Raja of Cachar lapsed on his death in 1830; and the Jaintia *parganas* were annexed in 1835.

A rebellion in Mysore, in 1831, was followed by a period of British administration until the rendition of Mysore by Lord Ripon in 1831. Coorg was annexed in 1834.

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THE GROWTH OF SIKH POWER UNDER RANJIT SINGH

THE Sikhs are not an ethnic group. Originally they were a religious brotherhood who broke away from the fold of Hinduism under Nanak (1469-1539), their first religious leader or *guru*. The greatest of their *gurus* was the tenth and last, Govind Singh (1675-1708), under whom they were transformed from a religious into a military brotherhood.

The death of Ahmad Shah Durrani, in 1773, enabled the Sikh chiefs to consolidate their position in the Panjab. At the close of the eighteenth century they were divided into *misl*s or groups of varying size and importance. The area between the Jhelum and the Sutlej was occupied by the following *misl*s: the Bhangis of Gujrat, Sialkot, Lahore, and Amritsar; the Ahluwalias around Kapurthala, Jullundur, and Hoshiarpur; and the Kanhyas of Gurdaspur. Muslim chiefs were in possession of the modern north-west frontier and Kashmir, while across the Sutlej dwelt the Sikhs of Patiala, Jind, and Nabha. Unity did not exist. Even the *misl*s were divided into hostile factions.

In 1790 Ranjit Singh became head of the Sukarchakia *misl* of Gujranwala. He rapidly came into prominence as leader of Sikh resistance to the Afghan invader, Zaman Shah. By 1809 he had absorbed the central Panjab into a

compact State. Writers have been inclined to over-estimate the importance of Metcalfe's mission (1808-9) to Ranjit Singh, for, although his territories may be dignified with the title of Kingdom, he did not become a formidable power until some years after Metcalfe's visit. The extent of his kingdom will be realized when it is remembered that Attock was not taken until 1813, Kashmir until 1819, Dera Ghazi Khan until 1820, and Dera Ismail Khan until 1821. As late as 1824 a serious rebellion of Muslim tribes occurred in the neighbourhood of Attock, while it was not until 1834, five years before his death, that Peshawar passed into Sikh hands. Moreover, it was Napoleon's sacrifice of Persian interests at Tilsit and the consequent decline of French influence at Teheran, rather than Metcalfe's abilities as a diplomat, which made possible the Treaty of 1809. After the decline of the French menace the British were in a position to demand that Ranjit Singh's aggressions on his co-religionists across the Sutlej should cease.


Ranjit Singh's greatness lies in the fact that he was able to weld all these discordant elements in the Panjab into a stable kingdom. In this he was aided by the distracted condition of Afghanistan. His death, in 1839, was the signal for disunion.

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THE GROWTH OF SIKH POWER UNDER RANJIT SINGH

Ranjit Singh's Territories
in 1809
Outer Boundary in 1839



SIKH TERRITORIES AT THE END OF THE FIRST SIKH WAR 1846

AFTER the death of Ranjit Singh, in 1839, the friendly relations which he had always carefully maintained underwent a sudden change. His kingdom became the scene of widespread lawlessness and domestic contentions. The only effective power was the army of the Sikh *Khalsa* which, in 1845, comprised 88,662 men supported by a powerful artillery.

By the Treaty of 1809 Ranjit Singh had been allowed to retain certain districts on the eastern bank of the Sutlej. This was a potential cause of war. A further cause of friction was that some of the Cis-Sutlej Sikhs under British protection also held lands on the western bank of the river as feudatories of the ruler of Lahore. Suspecting the British of contemplating annexation and eager for war, the Sikh army, in December 1845, crossed the Sutlej. They were defeated in desperate struggles at Mudki, Ferozeshah, Aliwal, and Sobraon. The Sikhs were compelled to surrender all lands on the British side of the Sutlej

together with the Jullundur Doab, to pay an indemnity, and to limit the strength of their armed forces. By the amended Treaty of December 1846, Sir Henry Lawrence became the real ruler of the Panjab as president of a council of regency. He was assisted by a team of brilliant colleagues, the chief of whom were John Lawrence, Herbert Edwardes, and John Nicholson. By the Treaty of Amritsar (1846), Gulab Singh, a Dogra raja, was placed in possession of all the hill country and its dependencies between the Indus and the Ravi, including Kashmir, Ladakh, Gilgit, and Chamba, but excluding Lahul. For this he was supposed to pay 75 lakhs of rupees (vide *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, C. U. Aitchison, vol. xi, 1909, No. CXXXI).

The new arrangements did not prove acceptable to the Sikhs and the second Sikh war broke out in 1848. After the battles of Chilianwala and Gujrat, the Panjab was annexed to British India.



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
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SIKH TERRITORIES

AT END OF

FIRST SIKH WAR 1846

 Sikh Territories
 Other Boundaries



INDIA AT THE CLOSE OF DALHOUSIE'S ADMINISTRATION

BETWEEN 1836 and the arrival of Dalhousie in 1848 the map of India had been altered by the annexation, in 1842, of Karnul in the Madras Presidency and by the conquest of Sind in 1843. Ali Murad, the ruler of Khairpur, who had supported the British in Sind was allowed to retain his State. The first Sikh war (1845-6) was followed by the cession of all lands on the British side of the Sutlej together with the Jullundur Doab between the Sutlej and the Beas. Kashmir was surrendered by the Sikhs to the British, who sold it to Gulab Singh, a Dogra raja of Jammu.

Soon after Dalhousie's arrival war once more broke out with the Sikhs (1848-9). Their military power was completely shattered and the Panjab became British territory. The annexation of Sind and the Panjab, by advancing the British administrative boundary across the Indus, made it coterminous with the territories of the independent Pathan tribes of the north-west frontier and brought the British into closer contact with the Amir of Kabul. For the first time the British political and geographical frontiers coincided.

In 1850, as a punishment for the kidnapping of British subjects, that part of the Sikkim State which comprised the lower course of the Tista river and the Sikkim tarai was annexed. Dar-


jeeling had been ceded as far back as 1835. The second Burmese war led to the acquisition of Pegu or lower Burma.

As a stage in the growth of British power in India, Dalhousie's administration is comparable only to those of Wellesley and the Marquess of Hastings. Under Dalhousie, in accordance with the doctrine of lapse, the following States became British territory: Satara (1848); Jaitpur, to the north-east of Jhansi (1849); Sambalpur (1849); Jhansi (1853); and Nagpur (1854). All these annexations were in accordance with the wishes of the Home Government. Only in one case, that of Karauli, did they refuse to accept Dalhousie's recommendation. The Cis-Sutlej State of Baghat was restored in 1862 and his decision with regard to Udaipur in the Central Provinces was also modified. Years of chronic misgovernment prompted Dalhousie, in 1856, to annex Oudh. This was the only case of annexation not in accordance with the doctrine of lapse or the result of conquest.

The Nizam's payments for the Hyderabad contingent were settled temporarily in 1853, when Berar and certain adjoining districts were assigned to the British in payment for this force.

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THE ABSORPTION OF BURMA

BURMESE aggressions were the principal cause of the first Burmese war (1824-6). In 1757 they annexed the Irrawaddy delta and Tenasserim. Arakan was conquered in 1785; Manipur in 1813; and Assam in 1816. Two years later they summoned the governor-general to surrender Chittagong, Murshidabad, and Dacca. After a badly managed campaign the British dictated terms by the Treaty of Yandabo (1826). The Burmese agreed to accept a British Resident; pay an indemnity of £1,000,000; surrender Assam, Arakan, and the coastal strip of Tenasserim; and abstain from all interference in Cachar, Jaintia, and Manipur.

The indignities to which the governor-general's representative was subjected led to his withdrawal in 1840. Dalhousie's failure to obtain satisfaction for acts of oppression on British merchants and the arrogance of the Burmese produced the second Burmese war (1852). After a successful campaign Dalhousie limited his annexations to Pegu.


Relations with upper Burma remained far from satisfactory. The decline of British influence was accelerated by the governor-general's refusal to allow the British Resident to comply with Burmese court etiquette. On the death of Mindon, in 1878, attempts were made to persuade the new king Thibaw to adopt a more

friendly policy. But the grievances of British traders remained and British subjects continued to be subjected to indignities. Because the Resident's personal safety was in jeopardy he was withdrawn from Mandalay in 1879. Matters reached a head when Thibaw imposed an enormous fine of 23 lakhs of rupees upon the Bombay and Burma Trading Company and concluded what was ostensibly a commercial treaty with France in 1885. A secret letter from the French Prime Minister to the Burmese Foreign Minister fell into British hands. This letter disclosed that arrangements would be made for the importation of arms into Burma from Tonkin. From 1882 to 1884 there was considerable friction over the demarcation of the Manipur-Burma frontier.

Little resistance was offered to the British advance in the third Burmese war of 1885. Upper Burma was annexed by proclamation on the 1st of January 1886, but five years of guerrilla warfare were required for the pacification of the country. The Shan States submitted in 1890, but fighting with the Chins lasted until 1896. By the Convention of Peking, in 1886, China recognized British rule in Burma and arrangements were made for the delimitation of the frontier between Burma and China. In 1892 and 1893 the frontier between Siam and the trans-Salween Shan States was demarcated.

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THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER OF INDIA (1908)

THIS map illustrates the position on the Indian frontier immediately after the signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. The north-west frontier is a belt of mountainous country stretching from the Pamirs to the shores of the Arabian Sea. Except where it is traversed by the five main mountain passes of the Khyber, Kurram, Tochi, Gomal, and Bolan, it presents a difficult barrier to invaders. The conquest of Sind and the Panjab brought the Government of India into closer contact with the Amir of Afghanistan and eventually led to complications with Russia in Central Asia. To a large extent Indian frontier policy has been regulated by the pressure of the political barometer in Europe, for friction between Britain and Russia in Europe has nearly always been followed by strained relations in Central Asia. Although other factors, such as the intrigues of the Amirs of Afghanistan with the frontier tribesmen, have played their part in determining Anglo-Afghan relations, by far the most important factor has been Russia's steady advance across the steppes of Central Asia.


It was the second Afghan war (1878-80) that impressed upon statesmen the necessity for a scientific frontier. There were four possible lines of resistance: the Indus; the old Sikh line roughly corresponding to the administrative boundary; the Durand line of 1893 which de-

limited the respective spheres of influence of the Amir of Afghanistan and the Government of India over the frontier tribes; and the so-called scientific frontier stretching from Kabul through Ghazni to Kandahar. (A discussion of the value of these lines of defence and of the arguments for and against the retention of Kandahar will be found in the author's *Problem of the North-West Frontier*, chs. i and ix.)

The British scheme of defence against Russia was settled not by military strategists but by diplomatists. In view of the steady advance of Russia towards the northern frontiers of Afghanistan, it was decided to form Afghanistan into a buffer state. At the same time the frontiers of Afghanistan were strictly defined by international agreement. Thus, in the closing years of the nineteenth century, the recognition of a definite frontier between Russia and Afghanistan led to a decided improvement in the Central Asian question. The real cause, however, of the Anglo-Russian *entente* was the growing German menace in Asia and elsewhere. The strength of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, so far as Afghanistan was concerned, lay in the fact that Russia for the first time recognized by treaty that Afghanistan lay entirely outside her sphere of action. She had finally pledged herself openly by an international agreement not to encroach on Afghan territory.

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Scale of Miles 0 50 100 150 200 250 300

The North-West Frontier of India (1908)

Scientific Frontier ...

Sandeman Line ...

Railways ...

Durand & Outer Boundary of India ...

Russo-Afghan & Russo-Persian Frontier ...

Other Boundaries ...

PATHAN TRIBAL DISTRIBUTION ON THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER

(For a detailed account of tribal distribution and characteristics the student should consult the author's *Problem of the North-West Frontier*, chs. iii-iv.)

BECAUSE Sind was conquered in 1843 and the Panjab in 1849 there grew up two distinct schools of frontier administration. The policy adopted in Sind was an uncompromising repression of outrages by a strong military force. Panjab frontier policy depended much more upon an efficient political management of the tribesmen. The Sind system was inapplicable to the Panjab frontier, where geographical conditions offered every inducement to a marauding life. Moreover, the British had succeeded to a heritage of anarchy, as the administration of their predecessors the Sikhs had been of the loosest type. All attempts at conciliation failed and the contumacious attitude of the tribesmen forced the British to resort to reprisals. Three methods of coercion were employed: fines, blockades, and expeditions. It was the inability of the Pathan tribes to coerce their unruly members that prevented punitive expeditions from having any lasting effects.

To the south, in Baluchistan, the Baluch tribes were tamed by what is known as the Sandeman system. Sandeman boldly advanced into the mountain retreats of the Baluch tribes and made

friends with their chiefs or *tumandars*. This was successful because the *tumandars* were powerful enough to control the tribes for which they were responsible and for which they received allowances. An attempt to introduce this system into Waziristan ended in failure for many reasons. The Pathan presents a striking contrast to his more southerly neighbour. He is intensely democratic, and, even where tribal chiefs or *maliks* exist, refuses to obey them. The Baluch is less turbulent, less fanatical, and far easier to control. The Sandeman system was also based upon the occupation of a commanding central position inside Baluchistan. Geographical conditions combined with financial reasons make this very difficult on the Pathan frontier. There is therefore no uniform frontier policy, and the British have been forced to adopt different tribal policies with innumerable local variations. The fact that neither the Durand Line of 1893 nor the present administrative boundary is an ethnic line adds to the extreme complexity of the problem.

It is often stated that the economic factor is at the root of all frontier disturbances, but an equally important cause of unrest has been political propaganda, especially anti-British propaganda from Afghanistan. The tribesmen's powers of resistance were strengthened by a flourishing arms traffic in the Persian Gulf which flooded the tribal areas with weapons of precision.

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SOUTH-WEST MONSOON NORTH-EAST MONSOON

MEAN ANNUAL RAINFALL

THE most important factor in the meteorology of India is the alteration of the seasons, known as the south-west and north-east monsoons.

The south-west monsoon, a wind of oceanic origin and consequently highly charged with humidity, is a continuation of the south-east trade wind. It advances across India from June to September and is said to be in retreat from October to December. It divides into two currents: one moves up the Bay of Bengal; the other up the Arabian Sea. Part of the Bay of Bengal current is deflected to Burma, but the main current proceeds over eastern Bengal and Assam. It is deflected by the Himalayas westwards across the Ganges plain to the hills of the north-west. The Arabian Sea current strikes the Western Ghats where it deposits heavy rainfall. The valleys of the Nerbudda and Tapti are the gates through which the monsoon finds access to the States of central India. It passes over Sind and the desert of Rajasthan until it meets the deflected Bay of Bengal current over the eastern Panjab. The full strength of this monsoon lasts for about three months. By the third week in September these two currents are retreating from northern India, and, by the end of October, have passed out of the country.

The north-east monsoon, which is sometimes referred to as the south-west monsoon in retreat, blows from the middle of October to the end of December and becomes hotter and drier as the spring advances.

With three exceptions India gets the whole of its rainfall in the three or four months of the south-west monsoon. The exceptions are:

1. The south-east coast of Madras, which is watered by both the easterly branch of the south-west monsoon and by the north-east monsoon (between October and December).
2. North-west India, which is subject to a succession of shallow storms from January to March.

3. The Gangetic plain, which receives slight winter rain and considerable spring rain (vide *The Economic Development of India*, V. Anstey, 1952, pp. 15-16).

During the monsoon months rain is not continuous, and breaks in the rainfall occur which are of extreme importance to the agriculturist, as incessant rainfall would cause the growing crops to rot.

The normal annual rainfall varies from 460 inches in Assam to less than 3 inches in upper Sind. The largest rainfall actually measured in India in one year was 905 inches at Cherrapunji in the Khasi hills of Assam in 1861.

The prosperity of India depends on the success or failure of the monsoon. This has affected the character of the Indian peasant and is one of the reasons for his fatalistic outlook on life. Slight variations in the direction of the rain-bearing winds may convert normally well-watered areas into desert. The time factor is also of vital importance.


The Indian Peninsula may be roughly divided into zones of certain and uncertain rainfall. The zones of certain rainfall are those with an average of not less than 40 to 50 inches per annum, for example, eastern Bengal, Assam, and the slopes of the Western Ghats; and all areas with an average of less than 15 inches per annum which are either desert or dependent on irrigation. The zones of uncertain rainfall are those with an average of from 15 to 40 inches per annum, for example, Uttar Pradesh, parts of Rajasthan, large parts of the States of Bombay, Madras, and Mysore.

An adequate supply of soil water for the plant is the first condition of success in crop-production. Heavy rainfall produces erosion and the loss of the most fertile portion of the soil. Furthermore, the duration of the monsoon is such that only rapidly maturing varieties of low potential yield can be cultivated. The annual

SOUTH-WEST MONSOON

July Isobars

Direction of Winds



loss of soil by erosion is immense and plays an important part in reducing the annual harvest. Often the surplus water runs to waste so rapidly that it fails to sink into the ground, which means that the reserve of water in the sub-soil is not replenished. Soil erosion, waterlogging, and shortage of soil moisture all occur because there is no control of the rain after it reaches the ground. To remedy the consequences of this irregular rainfall much progress has been made in the sphere of irrigation by the construction of wells, tanks, and a network of perennial inundation canals.

Cultivation also depends upon the character of the soil. Other important factors are the deposition of dew and the temperature during the growing season.

The influence of the monsoon is writ large in Indian history. Reference has already been made to the epoch-making discovery of Hippalus, which, by enabling mariners to make use of the monsoon winds, quickened the contact between East and West. Before the advent of steam navigation the monsoon had a profound effect on Indian naval warfare. This can be conveniently studied in *The Navy in India*, H. Richmond, 1931. Century after century the failure of the monsoon has produced disastrous famines throughout the length and breadth of the Indian peninsula.


The evidence of Megasthenes, the Greek ambassador to the Court of Chandragupta Maurya, that India was free from famines is contradicted by the early Buddhist records. Hindu sources refer to a famine after the death of Harsha in A.D. 647 and epigraphic evidence exists for famines under the Cholas of southern India. Constant references occur in the Muslim chronicles to serious famines both under the Sultans of Delhi and under the Mughal emperors. This is also corroborated by European evidence, for Dutch factors and travellers of the seventeenth century report thirteen famines between 1614 and 1660. According to the Muslim accounts efforts were made by the authorities to deal with these famines, but the dominant factor in the situation was the scarcity of food, which they could not counteract because of the backwardness of communications and the lack of

transport facilities. It is, however, impossible to compare modern famines with those of ancient and medieval India because there were no railways and no good roads, and there is for the past a complete absence of famine statistics.

It cannot be said that the East India Company displayed any great capacity for dealing with these frightful calamities. From the assumption of the *diwani* to the Mutiny, a period of about ninety years, India suffered, in one part or another, from twelve famines and four severe scarcities. No real attempt was made to grapple with the problem by introducing any system of famine relief and there was but little expenditure of public funds. It can be safely affirmed that amid the wars and financial difficulties attending the establishment of British power the claims of famine relief attracted small attention. Although relief-works were first opened by the Madras Government as early as 1792, the modern idea that famine relief is the responsibility of the State was not recognized until India passed under the Crown.

It was the Famine Commission of 1867 that laid the foundations of a more humane policy and enunciated the principle of saving life. In the Bihar famine of 1873-4 village inspection, the basis of modern famine organization, was carried out for the first time. The idea of famine insurance originated with Sir John Strachey who, in 1874, realized that famines were not abnormal but normal periodic calamities against which it was essential to make financial provision. The southern Indian famine of 1876-8 extended over a very wide area and the mortality was extremely heavy. It was during this famine that the Temple or reduced ration, named after Sir Richard Temple, was adopted in Madras and Bombay, but it was abandoned after three months as insufficient.

The Famine Commission of 1878-80 recognized that it was the paramount duty of the State to give relief in times of famine and formulated general principles of a preventive and protective character. The most important recommendation of this Commission was that a definite procedure should be embodied in a famine code to be carried out by the provincial governments subject to the financial control of the Government



of India. This policy was first tested in the famine of 1896-7. These principles were confirmed and extended by another Commission in 1898, but, unfortunately, the great famine of 1899-1900 occurred before the provincial governments had been able to revise their codes. The Famine Commission of 1901 recommended an efficient system of intelligence in order to obtain early estimates of the anticipated crop failure. It placed special emphasis on the immense importance of moral strategy, for moral depression led to physical deterioration.

There was a famine in the United Provinces in 1907-8 and a great scarcity in 1918. In more recent times 1½ million people died in 1943 and 1944 as a direct result of famine and the epidemics that followed in its wake. The Bengal famine of 1943, according to the Woodhead


Commission Report, was due to the failure of the main rice crop harvested in the winter of 1942. This, unfortunately, was aggravated by the loss of Burmese rice caused by the war with Japan and by a failure of the administration, both central and provincial, to take steps to ensure an equitable distribution of the available supplies.

There are certain danger signals which herald the approach of famine: a failure of the monsoon rains; a rise in prices; the contraction of private charity indicated by the wandering of paupers; a feverish activity in the grain market; an increase of petty crime; and unusual movements of flocks and herds in search of pasturage.

To prevent famines in India long-term measures are needed in the field of scientific cultivation and irrigation.

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ARYAN LANGUAGES

THE Aryan languages of northern India extend as far east as Assam and as far south as Goa.

The most important languages of the north-west frontier are *Baloch* (Baluchistan); *Pashtu* (Pathan frontier); and the *Ghalchah* languages of the Pamirs, to which the *Ormuri* of Kaniguram in Waziristan is akin. *Pashtu*, which radiates from Kandahar, is soft and sibilant. *Pakhtu*, the north-eastern dialect, is harsh and guttural.

Stretching from Kabul into Kashmir are a group of languages to which the term Dardic is applied. These are the *Kafir* dialects of Kafiristan, *Khowar* (Chitral), *Shina* (Gilgit), and *Kashmiri*. With the exception of *Kashmiri* the Dardic languages have no literatures.

The most important of all Indian languages is *Western Hindi*. Its principal dialect, *Hindustani*, is the nearest approach to a lingua franca. *Urdu* is a persianized form of *Hindustani*. There are four other dialects: *Bangaru* (SE. Panjab), *Braj Bhasha* (Muttra and the Central Gangetic Doab), *Kanauji*, and *Bundeli* (Bundelkhand and the upper reaches of the Nerbudda).

Eastern Hindi, the language of Oudh, Baghelkhand, and Chhattisgarh, is quite distinct from *Western Hindi*. It possesses a great literature.

Rajasthani (Rajputana) has three main dialects: *Mewati* or *Bighota*, *Malvi*, and *Jaipuri*. The *Pahari* languages of the Himalayas and the *Khas* of Nepal are offshoots of *Rajasthani*, apparently the results of colonization.

Gujarati (Gujarat) has a flourishing literature. Dialects of this are spoken by the Bhils and the inhabitants of Khandesh.

Panjabi is the language of the Sikhs of the central Panjab. The only real dialect is the *Dogri* of Jammu and the Kangra valley. *Lahnda* is spoken in the western Panjab.

Sindhi (Sind) has four main dialects: (*Saraiki* (upper Sind), *Lari* (lower Sind), *Thareli* (in the Thar), and *Kachchhi* in Cutch.


Marathi is spoken over a wide area of the Deccan. The purest form of the language is the 'Desi Marathi' around Poona. *Konkani* is regarded as a dialect.

The most easterly of the Indo-Aryan languages are *Bihari*, *Oriya*, *Bengali*, and *Assamese*. *Bihari* has three main dialects: *Maithili*, *Magahi*, and *Bhoj-puri*. *Oriya*, a very musical language, is spoken in Orissa. The literary form of *Bengali* differs from the colloquial because of its highly sanskritized vocabulary. It also owes much to Western influence, for the literature produced since 1800 is larger in bulk than the whole of the literature produced in the previous ten centuries. *Assamese*, the language of middle and upper Assam, is related to colloquial *Bengali*. Its literature is important.

It is hardly necessary to mention that no hard and fast linguistic boundaries can be drawn.

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NON-ARYAN LANGUAGES

Dravidian Languages

Tamil or *Arava*, the oldest of the Dravidian tongues, is spoken in southern India as far north as Mysore and the town of Madras. It is also the language of northern Ceylon.

Malayalam, a modern offshoot of *Tamil* dating from the ninth century A.D., is the language of the Malabar coast. It has one dialect, *Yerava*, spoken in Coorg.

Kanarese is the language of Mysore and the Ghat country. Two dialects, *Badaga* and *Kurumba*, are spoken in the Nilgiris. *Kodagu*, the language of Coorg, is also regarded as a Kanarese dialect. *Toda* and *Kota* are spoken by small groups in the Nilgiris.

Telugu or *Andhra* is the most important language in the east from Madras to Orissa.

Of the central Dravidian languages the most important is *Gondi*, which is spoken in isolated pockets in the Central Provinces, Bastar, and northern Hyderabad. *Kandh* or *Kui* is spoken by the Khonds of the Orissa hills. The speakers of *Kolami* in the Central Provinces and Berar are not very numerous. *Parji* is the tongue of about 10,000 people in southern Bastar. *Kurukh* or *Oraon* is the dialect of a tribe in Chota Nagpur and parts of the Central Provinces. Farther north, near Rajmahal on the Ganges, the Maler tribe speak *Malto*.

Brahui, a Dravidian language surrounded by the Indo-Aryan tongues of Baluchistan, presents a problem to both linguists and ethnologists.

Austro-Asiatic Family

1. *Munda languages*. These are principally

spoken in Chota Nagpur and in the neighbouring hill tracts of the Central Provinces and Orissa. The most important is *Kherwari*, of which *Santali* or *Har* is a dialect. *Juang* is the language of a small tribe in the hills of Orissa. *Savara* is spoken in the Madras Presidency near the Orissa border. *Kurku* is the language of the Mahadeo hills.

2. *Other Austro-Asiatic languages*. These are represented in India by *Khasi*, spoken in the Khasi and Jaintia hills of Assam; and by *Nicobarese*, the language of the Nicobar islands.

Tibeto-Burman Languages

Stretching along the Himalayas are to be found *Balti* in Baltistan, *Ladakhi* in Ladakh, *Bhotia* or *Tibetan*, *Denjongke* in Sikkim, and *Lho-ke* in Bhutan. Closely connected are the *Newari* of Nepal and the *Lepcha* of Sikkim. Technically these are called 'non-pronominalized' to distinguish them from *Limbu* and other languages in this area which Hodgson classified as 'pronominalized'.


Other Tibeto-Burman languages are *Aka* and *Dafla*, spoken by the wild tribes to the north of the Assam valley; *Garo* in the Garo hills; *Tipura* or *Mrung* in Hill Tippera; the *Naga* languages of central and eastern Assam; and the *Kuki-Chin* languages of Manipur.

Burmese is the predominant language of Upper and Lower Burma.

Burushaski in Hunza and Nagar on the extreme north-west of India, and *Andamanese* in the Andaman islands, have not yet been classified.

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ECONOMIC PRODUCTS (ANIMAL AND VEGETABLE)

INDIA and Pakistan are essentially agricultural countries with more than 600,000 villages dotting the plains from Cape Comorin to the Afghan frontier. Hence the improvement of agriculture is by far the most pressing problem facing both India and Pakistan, more urgent even than industrialization.

India

India is one of the world's most important producers of cane-sugar, groundnuts, cashew nuts, tea and pepper. She is also an important producer of tobacco, chiefly a coarse species. Rice, the staple food of the majority of the population, is the most widely grown cereal. It is the chief crop of the Carnatic, but millets, such as jowar, bajra, and ragi, are also extensively grown. The Deccan is noted for its black cotton soils which are best suited to growing deep-rooted crops, notably Indian strains of cotton. The area from West Bengal to Uttar Pradesh produces practically all the staple crops of India. Assam and the Nilgiris are noted for tea plantations. Bihar was once important because of its indigo and opium plantations, but these have now almost disappeared.

So far as livestock is concerned, India possesses approximately 155,000,000 head of cattle; 43,000,000 buffaloes; 47,000,000 goats; and 39,000,000 sheep. Far more cattle are maintained than the land can satisfactorily support. Selective breeding is beset with many difficulties and uncastrated scrub bulls are a menace.


She has vast fisheries of which only a limited use is made.

Pakistan

The economic consequences of the partition of the Indian sub-continent can be conveniently studied in C. N. Vakil's *Economic Consequences of Divided India* (1950). Undivided India had almost a world's monopoly of raw jute. It is now a major factor in the economy of East Pakistan which is an extremely fertile area. West Pakistan grows wheat and cotton, the latter being mostly of medium or long staple in contrast to the bulk of India's cotton which is short-stapled. Pakistan's agricultural production has not kept pace with the growth of population. Since 1953 she has had to import food-grains.

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ECONOMIC PRODUCTS (MINERALS)

India

THE chief mineral products of India are coal, manganese ore, gold, salt, iron-ore, mica, saltpetre, and monazite. She is extremely poor in deposits of the base metals, tin, lead, zinc, and copper.

After the United Kingdom, India is the largest coal-producing unit of the Commonwealth. Most of her coal comes from the Gondwana coalfields of West Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, especially the Raniganj and Jharia fields. In 1946 the total production of the whole sub-continent was approximately 30,000,000 tons. Since Partition the production figures for the Indian Union alone have risen from 32,000,000 tons in 1950 to 37,000,000 in 1954. Unfortunately the quality of Indian coal leaves much to be desired. Most of it is bituminous, and its calorific value is not high. The large-scale production of coal and iron in India has followed large-scale textile production and transport development, instead of preceding it, as in England and Western countries. The railways are still the principal consumers of Indian coal. Recent surveys have led to the discovery of large reserves of coal suitable for coking and blending.

India's resources in high-grade iron-ore are perhaps the greatest in the world, but it is


exceptional to have these deposits in suitable proximity to satisfactory coal supplies. The chief deposits are in Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, and Mysore. India produces three-quarters of the world's sheet and block mica. About 80 per cent of this comes from Bihar. Brine salt is obtained from the Sambhar Lake in Rajasthan. High-grade chromite is produced in large quantities in Mysore and Bihar. Gold is mined at Kolar in Mysore and at Hutti in the Raichur Doab. Monazite deposits were discovered in Travancore in 1908. In this area the production of ilmenite began in 1922. By 1927 India had become the world's leading producer of ilmenite. The increase was due to the demand for titanium dioxide in the manufacture of titanium paints.

Pakistan

With the exception of petroleum Pakistan's mineral resources are dwarfed by those of India. Rock-salt deposits exist in the Salt Range and other areas of West Pakistan. High-grade chromite is found in Baluchistan. At Sui in the Bugti tribal area of Baluchistan enough natural gas has been discovered to supply all West Pakistan's industrial and civil requirements for generations to come.

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


DENSITY OF POPULATION

ACCORDING to the 1951 Census Report the total population of the sub-continent, excluding Kashmir, was approximately 433,000,000. (India, 356,829,485 : Pakistan, 75,842,000). The percentages of growth at successive enumerations have been 11.7 (1891), 1.5 (1901), 6.7 (1911), 0.9 (1921), 10.6 (1931), 15.0 (1941), and 12.3 (1951). The rate of growth is somewhat exaggerated, for at every census fresh areas have come under enumeration. The 1931 Census figures suffered from under-enumeration as the census, because of Mr. Gandhi's civil disobedience campaign, incurred hostility as a governmental activity. In 1931 the census could not be taken in the city of Ahmedabad : in 1941, because of the growing communal tension, practically all communities became census-conscious. Throughout the sub-continent there is a tendency for the population to increase until it presses upon the means of subsistence. This keeps the peasant dangerously near the subsistence level. To remedy this experts have recommended an

increase in the productivity of the soil, either extensively, by adding to the area under cultivation, or intensively, by improving the crops in existing areas ; a reduction of the pressure by emigration or by transferring part of the population to other occupations ; the extension of health services ; birth-control ; and the education of the villagers.

Although industry absorbs a certain proportion of the village population, it is no easy matter for an illiterate peasantry to discover alternative occupations. Moreover, the population is extremely immobile, for the people are home-loving and cling tenaciously to their local areas. Colour prejudice and economic considerations play an important part in restricting immigration into other countries of the Commonwealth (vide W. K. Hancock, *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, vol. i, ch. iv, 1937). Neither is it easy to persuade a people to adopt any system of birth-control when the begetting of sons is a religious duty.



PREVAILING RELIGIONS


In India Hindus are everywhere in a majority. The population of Pakistan is preponderantly Muslim (West Pakistan, 97%; East Pakistan, 77%).

The geographical distribution of the Muslim community in India is the result of invasion and conversion. Muslims are concentrated in northern, eastern, and parts of central India. South of the Vindhyas, where the Muslim penetration came centuries later, they form an insignificant proportion of the population. Practically all Sikhs have left Pakistan for the Panjab and adjoining areas. The only place where Christians predominate is in the Portuguese possession of Goa. They are also to be found in Madras, Kerala, and Assam. Large numbers of the tribal people in Assam are

Christians. There are about 27,000 Jews in India.

The following figures for India are based on the 1951 Census Report :

<i>Community</i>	<i>Total (millions)</i>	<i>Percentage of population</i>
Hindus	303.2	85
Muslims	35.4	10
Christians	8.2	2.3
Sikhs	6.2	1.74
Jains	1.6	0.45
Buddhists	0.2	0.06
Zoroastrians	0.1	0.03
Other religions (tribal)	1.7	0.47
Other religions (non-tribal)	0.1	0.003



MAIN LINES OF RAILWAY COMMUNICATION

UNTIL 1951 there were forty-two railway systems in India named after the companies and states that managed them. In 1951 they were nationalized and reorganized on a zonal basis.

(1) *The Central Railway*, headquarters at Bombay, formed by amalgamating the Great Indian Peninsula Railway (G.I.P.R.), the Nizam's State Railway, the Scindia State Railway, and the Dholpur State Railway.

(2) *The Eastern Railway*, headquarters at Calcutta, formed by combining the Bengal Nagpur Railway (B.N.R.) with part of the East Indian Railway (E.I.R.). It is important because it brings the coal-fields of Bengal and Bihar and the adjoining steel works under one railway administration.

(3) *The Northern Railway*, headquarters at Delhi, comprises the former Eastern Punjab, Jodhpur, and Bikaner Railways, together with parts of the E.I.R. and Western Railway.

(4) *The North-Eastern Railway*, headquarters at Gorakhpur, amalgamates the former Oudh-Tirhut Railway with the Assam Railway.

(5) *The Southern Railway*, headquarters at Madras, comprises the Madras and South Mahratta Railway (M. and S.M.R.), the Mysore State Railway, and the South Indian Railway (S.I.R.).

(6) *The Western Railway*, headquarters at Bombay, comprises the Bombay, Baroda, and Central India Railway (B.B. and C.I.R.), the Saurashtra, Rajasthan, and Jaipur Railways.


There were no railways in India until Dalhousie's minute of 1853 and the Rebellion of 1857 opened the eyes of the Government of India to their importance. By 1859 eight companies had been formed under what is known as the Original Guarantee System (vide *Development of Indian Railways*, N. Sanyal, pp. 15-17). For forty years they were unremunerative and imposed a heavy burden on Indian revenues (vide *Indian Railways: Rates and Regulations*, N.B. Mehta). From 1870 to 1880 was a period of government railway construction which was followed from 1880 to 1900 by a return to a Modified Guarantee System. After 1900, when the contracts of the original guaranteed companies expired, these railways were purchased by the State. But railway administration remained very complicated and there were no less than thirty-three separate administrative bodies working the railways. From 1900 to 1914 was a period of rapid railway extension and for the first time profits were made. The Acworth Committee Report of 1921 condemned the condition of the railways and led to important changes and developments. It was not until 1951 that Indian Railways were nationalized.


The development of communications has been one of the most important factors in the history of India since 1857 leading to centralization and national unity.


Pakistan has two separate railway systems: The North-Western Railway in West Pakistan; and the East Bengal Railway in East Pakistan.

MAIN LINES OF RAILWAY COMMUNICATION

Railways 
Shipping Routes 







U. S. S. R.

SIN - KIANG

AFGHANISTAN

CHINA

TIBET

Kabul

KASHMIR &

JAMMU

Srinagar

WEST PUNJAB

LAHORE

EAST PUNJAB

Amritsar

Delhi

RAJPUTANA

Jaipur

United Provinces

Allahabad

Bihar

Patna

Assam

Shillong

Manipur

Burma

Andaman Islands

CEYLON

Colombo

Kandy

Hyderabad

Madras

Bombay

Calcutta

Rangoon

Yokohama

Manila

London

Paris

Berlin

Rome

Warsaw

Stockholm

Oslo

Copenhagen

Helsinki

Tallinn

Riga

Vilnius

Kaunas

Lithuania

Latvia

Estonia

Finland

Sweden

Norway

Denmark

Poland

Czechoslovakia

Slovakia

Hungary

Romania

Bulgaria

Greece

Turkey

Iran

Afghanistan

U.S.S.R.

China

Tibet

India

Pakistan

15 August 1947

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Oxford University Press

OXFORD LONDON GLASGOW NEW YORK
TORONTO MELBOURNE WELLINGTON CAPE TOWN
IBADAN NAIROBI DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA ADDIS ABABA
KUALA LUMPUR SINGAPORE JAKARTA HONG KONG TOKYO
DELHI BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS KARACHI

© Oxford University Press 1959

First Published 1949
Second edition 1959
Tenth impression 1976

PRINTED IN INDIA BY T. DURAI
THE DIOCESAN PRESS, CHURCH ROAD, MADRAS 600007
PUBLISHED BY R. DAYAL
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, ANNA SALAI, MADRAS 600006

Rs 5.00

SBN 19 560250 1



